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Personhood, the Soul, and
Non-Conscious Human Beings:
Some Critical Reflections on
Recent Forms of Argumentation
within the Pro-Life Movement
Peter J. Colosi
A BST RACT
This paper has grown out of concerns that I have about the way in which
some pro-life arguments have been developing recently, and it is written in
a spirit of frank dialogue with those whom I consider allies. I present three
basic problems within some prominent contemporary pro-life argumentation, all three of which are rooted in a general tendency towards relying on
empirical science in an increasingly exclusive way as the foundation of
those arguments. The three problems that I touch on are: a neglect of the
role of God in human procreation, a neglect of the dignity of women, and
a neglect of understanding personal being.

INTRODUCTION
This paper has grown out of concerns that I have about the way in which
some pro-life arguments have been developing recently.1 Thus, I conceive
of this paper as a set of critical reflections on some arguments given
recently by people within the pro-life movement. While I will not shy

1

Just after I presented this paper at the University Faculty for Life meeting, the
following article appeared: Thomas K. Nelson, M.D., “A Human Being Must Be
a Person,” The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly (Summer 2007): 293-314.
In that article Nelson’s position and my own are the same in some areas. I am
grateful that another thinker has come to the same conclusion, particularly with
respect to the personhood of the earliest human embryo. I have added references
to his paper here, including one place of disagreement.
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away from frank dialogue with pro-life allies, I would like to state here at
the beginning that a desire for genuine dialogue is motivating me. And
while in this short paper I will only be able to cite quotations from a few
authors, I think that there is a general trend within a segment of the prolife philosophical community towards reducing arguments to empirical
methods alone. This trend is no doubt rooted in the surprising developments in genetic/biological science that have revealed beyond doubt that
even the tiniest members of our species are undeniably distinct human
beings. It should be pointed out here at the beginning that the argument
from genetics and biology is a good pro-life argument. Its power to
convince is based on the fact that each one of us is the same biological
organism that began as a zygote and developed on an unbroken continuum
to adulthood.2 Nonetheless, the trend to use the force of that argument as
the sole argument is dangerous, for it tends to miss important dimensions
of reality related to the meaning of procreation, respect for women, and
the meaning of personal existence.
M ECHANICAL L ANGUAGE
There is a new form of language that has grown out of the advances in
genetic science. I believe that a problematic dimension of this language
has crept into some pro-life arguments and has led to the “blindspot” with
respect to the three areas that I will discuss.

2

In their response to Lee M. Silver, who attempted to deny that a human embryo
is a human being, Patrick Lee and Robert P. George made this point in the
following clear way (National Review Online, Jan. 22, 2007): “Plainly, the
complete human organism that is now you, the reader, was once an adolescent
and before that an infant. Were you once an embryo? If Silver’s view is correct,
the answer is ‘no.’ But the truth is that the answer is ‘yes’–you were once an
embryo, just as you were once an adolescent, a child, an infant, and a fetus. The
human organism that is now you is the very same organism that began in the
embryonic stage and developed by a gradual and gapless process of self-directed
growth to the mature stage of a human being. By contrast, you were never a
sperm cell or an ovum. The sperm cell and ovum whose union brought you into
existence were genetically and functionally parts of other, larger organisms–your
parents. But the organism–the new and distinct human individual–who was
brought into existence by their union is the organism that is now reading these
words.”
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At the World Conference of Families (held in Poland, May 11–13,
2007) the bioethicist Nigel Cameron warned of a dangerous mechanical
vocabulary to be found in the way experts talk about the human being that
changes attitudes about human life and family.3 Cameron was also one of
the thirty-five signers of the much-discussed Joint Statement on ANTOAR (Altered Nuclear Transfer–Oocyte Assisted Reprogramming).4 This
document claims that “the oocyte cytoplasm is sufficient to reprogram the
somatic nucleus to a totipotent state.” I submit that this line from that Joint
Statement, and particularly the term “reprogram,” is a prime example of
the danger that Cameron warned against at the World Congress.
The statement that “the oocyte cytoplasm is sufficient to reprogram
the somatic nucleus to a totipotent state” means that cloning works, at
least in animals. In laymen’s terms, cloning is a method of creating a new
member of a species without the use of sperm. The egg of a female
member of the species (oocyte) has its nucleus removed and then replaced
with the nucleus of a body cell, which contains the complete DNA for that
species, from another member of that species. When electricity is
supplied, the egg now containing the body cell nucleus begins to behave
just as an egg that has been fertilized with sperm: it begins to divide and
to become an embryo. It can then be implanted into the uterus of an adult
female member of that species; she becomes pregnant and gives birth.
This is how Dolly the sheep was created. This means that the cytoplasm
in the egg has the power to bring the nucleus of a body cell back to the
earliest stage of life and to generate a new living member of that species.
This is quite a surprising power. As far as we know, this technique has not
yet succeeded with humans or any primates. It does work on many species

3

See Susan Y oshihara, “World Congress of Families Pledges Solidarity with
Europe,” C-FAM, Friday Fax 10/22 (May 17, 2007), accessed June 15, 2007 at:
http://www .c-fam.org/index.php?option=com_content& task=view&id=659&
Itemid=102.
4

“Production of Pluripotent Stem Cells by Oocyte Assisted Reprogramming,”
June 20, 2005. The joint statement can be found here: http://www.eppc.org/
publications/pubID.2374/pub_detail.asp (last accessed, June 15, 2007).
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of animals.5
The signers of the Joint Statement want to tap into the power of the
cytoplasm of a human egg–I would call that power its mysterious
procreative power (as opposed to calling it a “reprogramming” power) 6 –in
order, they claim, directly to create a pluripotent embryonic stem cell
rather than a totipotent (zygote) cell. In laymen’s terms this means that
scientists have discovered that it is possible to “silence” or to “hyperactivate” genes that are present within the body cell and the cytoplasm of
the egg before beginning the cloning process, i.e., before inserting the
body cell nucleus into the egg and supplying electricity. Scientists then
observe what effect this genetic engineering has had on the organism once
the cytoplasm of the egg begins its “reprogramming” of the body cell
DNA. They have discovered that the product of the cloning process (once
the genes have been manipulated) behaves much differently than a normal
embryo does. In the case of ANT-OAR they have noticed that the cell
produced in this way exhibits characteristics that are always found in stem
cells but never found in zygotes. For this reason they have strongly
suggested that OAR will never produce a human being but only a stem
cell.7

5

I have chosen for this article to express the cloning process in laymen’s terms.
There are, however, numerous sources where one can learn the intricate biological
details. For example, http://www.alterednucleartransfer.com/ (last accessed, June
15, 2007). This is the website of those who developed and promote ANT and
ANT-OAR.
6

In 1988 the then Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger delivered a paper (“D er Mensch
Zwischen Reproduktion und Schöpfung. Theologische Fragen Zum Ursprung
Menschlichen Lebens”) in which he expressed his dismay at the shift in
terminology from “procreation” to “reproduction.” I think the shift in the Joint
Statement to the term “reprogramming” is a further step in the direction that
Cardinal Ratzinger found worrisome. He delivered this lecture on April 4, 1988
during the 900th anniversary celebrations of the University of Bologna and again,
in a slightly revised form, on October 23, 1988 when he received an honorary
doctorate from the Catholic University of Lublin.
7

For detailed explanations of this process see http://www.alterednucleartransfer.
com/ (last accessed, June 15, 2007). For another excellent explanation of the
biology of ANT-OAR, including his critique of the signer’s conclusions, see
David L. Schindler, “A Response to the Joint Statement ‘Production of
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The technical language that they use (especially the term “reprogramming”) can direct the reader away from the fact that it is precisely the
procreative power that is being “tapped,” and this, I submit is a problem.
T HE M EANING OF P ROCREATION AND
M ECHANICAL L ANGUAGE A TTITUDE S HIFTS
I am not a biologist, and so I do not intend in this section to prove that the
product of OAR is biologically a human body. I do, however, find the
argument of David L. Schindler convincing that the goal of the Joint
Statement–eventually to prove that the product of the OAR procedure is
a stem cell and not an embryo–cannot be achieved by the method
proposed. This is because, Schindler argues, the product of that procedure
could just as likely (or even more likely) be a “one-celled human embryo
made to look like a stem cell” that has been genetically pre-programmed
to begin exhibiting pluripotent characteristics at its inception. Schindler
explains that OAR relies on cloning technology, which is an artificial
replication of conception; since conception produces a new member of a
species, “the mere act of modifying the epigenetic profile8 of the OAR
product cannot be sufficient to prevent that product from being, or having
been, an incipient human organism.”9 Another way in which he makes this
point is to see that the defenders of OAR have built into their philosophical argument various presuppositions that “commit them in advance to the
conclusion that that entity [the product of OAR] would necessarily have
been a non-embryo from the beginning” 10 if it became a tumor when
implanted in the womb of a female. If this were to occur in animal tests,
it will justify moving the procedure to the world of humans. Schindler
then rightly pointed out that

Pluripotent Stem Cells by Oocyte Assisted Reprogramming’,” Communio 32
(2005): 369-80.
8

The terms “epigenetic profile” and “epigenetic state” are expressions referring
to which genes are turned on or off in a particular cell.

9

See Schindler, “Response,” pp. 371-74.

10

David Schindler, Letter to the Editor, Crisis (April 2006). The letter can be
found online at http://www.crisismagazine.com/april2006/letters.htm (last
accessed, June 15, 2007).
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…although the OAR-generated entity might behave like a tumor when implanted,
it was more likely–with reasonable certitude–to have been an embryo in its
original coming into being, albeit an embryo engineered in advance to begin
virtually instantaneously to act in a non-embryonic manner (exhibiting pluripotency rather than totipotency).11

The Joint Statement, in its exclusive emphasis on the “reprogramming”
ability of the oocyte and the resultant pluripotent characteristics that are
observed through its epigenetic state, necessarily excludes consideration
of the theological-metaphysical fact that the procreation of human beings
involves both God and man. Although not drawn out by Schindler,12 the

11

12

Schindler, “Letter.”

One of Schindler’s goals is to express the ontological dependence and mystery
found at the coming into being of a new human being in terms “accessible to all
reasonable human beings (even if religious belief is necessary for an adequate or
complete understanding of this reality)” (Schindler, “Response,” p. 376). In my
own words, it seems to me that Schindler’s point is this: There is an utter mystery
in the coming into being of a new human person, and this mystery is experienced
by us as a complete gift. Even an atheist knows that he did not create himself, but
just “gets” to be here–his existence is experienced by him as a gift. And parents
also experience their child as a mysterious gift; they do not think of themselves
and their gametes as the total explanation of their new child; rather, they are
surprised by the existence of this new being, and grateful. This dimension of new
human life is simply not exhaustively accounted for in terms of biology and
genetics. On the exclusive basis of an altered epigenetic profile, therefore, one
cannot exhaustively prove that the procreative dimension of a conception event
did not occur. See Schindler, “Response,” pp. 374-77. In this part of my article,
I intend to speak openly about the theological point that Schindler may have been
referring to when he remarks that religious belief is necessary for an adequate
understanding of this reality. The point needs to be stated openly, particularly in
light of the fact that many of the signers have the faith that holds this view. In one
paragraph, Schindler does express the point theologically: “The ontological
dependence/givenness of the organism is so key because it is precisely here that
we see the (paradoxical) link between God and the creature’s originality (and
independence) as a creature. That is, God gives the organism to itself and so
creates an originality that by definition we cannot know or control exhaustively,
an originality that we therefore should not attempt or claim to know or control
exhaustively. But OAR does involve, at least implicitly, a claim to know and
control the beginning of human life exhaustively–exhaustively enough, that is, to
be able to remake the act [conception] that originates a new human being into an
act that (seemingly) originates only a pluripotent stem cell” (Schindler,
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theological reason for asserting that the product of OAR is more likely a
human embryo in its original coming into being is that God is immediately present at the moment of human procreation. The Catechism of the
Catholic Church puts it this way at §366: “The Church teaches that every
spiritual soul is created immediately by God–it is not ‘produced’ by the
parents....” God is present in human procreation in a way in which He is
not present in animal reproduction.13 When human procreation occurs,
God is immediately present because of love–He loves intensely the person
about to come into being by His power in conjunction with the material
elements provided by humans.14 This is supposed to happen in marriage

“Response,” pp. 375-76).
13

The signers of the Joint Statement also said: “Our proposal is for initial research
using only nonhuman animal cells. If, but only if, such research establishes
beyond a reasonable doubt that oocyte-assisted reprogramming can reliably be
used to produce pluripotent stem cells without creating embryos, would we
support research on human cells.”
It seems however that from the point of view of God’s immediate
participation in human procreation that ever so many animal tests would be
useless as a means to justify moving the procedure to the world of humans. That
is, while God indeed loves all of His creation, it seems that He is not immediately
present with this gaze of love when animal reproduction occurs. God’s
involvement, I would suggest, is different in kind when the procreation of a
unique and unrepeatable human person destined for eternal life with Him comes
into being, as opposed to when an animal is reproduced. This difference gives rise
to serious theological-metaphysical concerns and questions that animal testing is
incapable of answering.
Schindler expresses another reason why animal testing is not capable of
answering the question whether the product of OAR is a non-embryo (i.e., just a
stem cell) or a severely defective embryo. He points out, by citing one of the
signatories to the Joint Statement, that their method will be to produce an OARgenerated mouse cell and to implant it into a mouse. If it becomes a mouse, they
will conclude that it was an embryo, and if it becomes a tumor they will conclude
that it never was a mouse embryo. But this method is incapable of guaranteeing
the right answer to the question “whether the entity produced by O AR fails to
grow into a mouse because it is a mouse embryo that is gravely defective or
because on the contrary it is not a mouse embryo at all.” See, Schindler,
“Response,” pp. 372-73.
14

Evangelium vitae §61 beautifully states: “Human life is sacred and inviolable
at every moment of existence, including the initial phase which precedes birth.
All human beings, from their mothers’ womb, belong to God who searches them
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in an act of love between the spouses, but God respects what He has
created in human biology, and so it also happens in IVF and, if it should
ever succeed, in cloning.15 When the procreative power of matter is about
to work, God becomes immediately present16 to create a unique and
unrepeatable person17 with a rational soul who is destined for eternal life.

and knows them, who forms them and knits them together with his own hands,
who gazes on them when they are tiny shapeless embryos and already sees in
them the adults of tomorrow whose days are numbered.... There too, when they
are still in their mothers’ womb–as many passages of the Bible bear witness–they
are the personal objects of God’s loving and fatherly providence.”
15

It is an interesting question to ask whether God would ever put a soul into a
cloned human. To ask this question is to raise innumerable theological and
metaphysical questions. From a pro-life perspective it would be wonderful, on
one level, if cloning humans were metaphysically impossible because God would
not participate. N onetheless, there would remain numerous other reasons for
which cloning using human material would not be morally permissible, even if
we could know with certainty that God would never put a soul there. Some of
these reasons will be discussed in this paper. Maria Fedoryka, in a discussion on
this point, suggested that perhaps God would not participate in cloning because
there is no sperm involved and that this fact takes cloning far enough away from
the biology that God respects when IVF occurs.
16

See Nelson, “A Human Being Must Be a Person,” p. 299. In commenting on
“any position on early ontogeny which asserts or concedes a delay in
personhood,” he states: “these positions are problematic and inconsistent with
progressive statements of the Magisterium, such as Pope John Paul II’s explicit
assertion that God’s own image and likeness is transmitted in procreation, ‘thanks
to the creation of an immortal soul,’ and his reference to many biblical passages
that speak of ‘the intimate connection between the initial moment of life and the
action of God the Creator.’ What can this action be other than the infusion of the
spiritual soul, the ontological ground of personhood?” (The quotes from Pope
John Paul II here are from Evangelium vitae §60).
Another author who has argued that the Magisterium has already in effect
pronounced affirmatively on the question of the personhood of the earliest
embryo is Josef Seifert, “The Right to Life and the Fourfold Root of Human
Dignity” in The Nature and Dignity of the Human Person As The Foundation of
the Right to Life: Proceedings of the Eighth Assembly of the Pontifical Academy
for Life (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2003), p. 200 n12.
17

This language of “unique and unrepeatable person” as a way to express a
profound dimension of personal existence can be found throughout many of the
writings of Karol Wojty»a/Pope John Paul II and also in Joseph Ratzinger/Pope
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He does this because of love for that person. If the signers of the OAR
proposal tap into that particular power, a power that God respects, there
is no way for them to know that God did not become immediately present
in that moment and create a soul. This act of God cannot be empirically
observed. But the promoters of OAR rely exclusively on empirical data
(i.e., they check to see if the epigenetic profile looks like that of a
pluripotent cell) to attempt an exhaustive determination concerning that
cell’s ontological nature. Since God respects biology in ways that might
surprise us (e.g., in IVF and cloning), it is highly likely that He would
have created a soul in OAR, regardless of how many genes were hyperactivated to make it behave, virtually instantaneously, with pluripotent
characteristics.
Consider the following theological texts dealing with the question of
procreation, that is, the inception of a new human person. In Evangelium
vitae §44 and §68 John Paul II lists numerous scripture passages that point
to God’s love for babies in the womb. He then asks a profound rhetorical

Benedict XVI. I have collected numerous such texts in the writings of Karol
Wojty»a/Pope John Paul II and attempted to express their precise meaning and
sources in Peter J. Colosi, “The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought
of Karol Wojty»a/Pope John Paul II, with Emphasis on His Indebtedness to Max
Scheler,” ed. Nancy Mardas Billias, Agnes B. Curry and George F. McLean
(Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2008),
pp. 61-100. This paper of mine represents a certain disagreement with Nelson, “A
Human Being Must Be a Person,” p. 310. While I can agree with most of what
Nelson says on p. 310, there is a passage in which he identifies himself with the
position of Stephen L. Brock in his article “Crosby and Aquinas on Personal
Dignity,” Thomist 69/2 (2005): 173-201, e.g.: “The idea of self-possession, of
being for its own sake, is a characteristic of personhood which implies far more
than just ontological uniqueness or not having a copy or duplicate” (Nelson, p.
310). He references Brock’s article because in it Brock rejects John F. Crosby’s
notion of “incommunicability” as the deepest source of the dignity of persons. See
John F. Crosby, The Selfhood of the H um an Person (Washington D.C.: The
Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1996), ch. 2. In my article I attempt to show that
personal uniqueness as developed by Crosby, which he calls the
“incommunicability” of persons, and by Max Scheler, which he calls the
“individual value essence” of persons or simply the “individual person,” and by
Pope John Paul II, which he calls the “unique and unrepeatable” dimension of
persons, are the same. For an example where Joseph Ratzinger uses the phrase
“unique and unrepeatable” to refer to personal dignity see Christianity and the
Crisis of Cultures, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco CA: Ignatius Press, 2006),
p. 66.
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question: “How can anyone think that even a single moment of this
marvelous process of the unfolding of life could be separated from the
wise and loving work of the Creator, and left prey to human caprice?” 18
And he adds,
Human life is sacred and inviolable at every moment of existence, including the
initial phase which precedes birth. All human beings, from their mothers’ womb,
belong to God who searches them and knows them, who forms them and knits
them together with his own hands, who gazes on them when they are tiny
shapeless embryos and already sees in them the adults of tomorrow whose days
are numbered.... There too, when they are still in their mothers’ womb–as many
passages of the Bible bear witness–they are the personal objects of God’s loving
and fatherly providence.19

Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger also refers to the image of God’s gaze with
respect to the coming into being of a new person when he says:
Christianity is this remembrance of the look of love that the Lord directs to man,
this look that preserves the fullness of his truth and the ultimate guarantee of his
dignity. The mystery of Christmas reminds us that in the Christ who is born,
every human life–from the very beginning–is definitively blessed and welcomed
by the look of God’s mercy. Christians know this and stand with their own life
under this look of love....20

Do these texts not engender an image of a specific someone who “from
the very beginning” is present with an inner actuality not only of human
nature, but also of their very unique spiritual personal being, already loved
by God as that person?
If all of this is happening at that mysterious moment of procreation,
then is it really possible, in the case of human persons, to harness the
procreative power of oocytes to “reprogram” without pulling God into the
event? He is present in both normal and IVF human conception events
and, if reproductive cloning should ever succeed, He may very well be
present there as well. In the case of OAR, what happens? Does God notice

18

Pope John Paul II, Evangelium vitae §44.

19

Evangelium vitae §61.

20

Joseph Ratzinger, Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, trans. Brian McNeil
(San Francisco CA: Ignatius Press, 2006), p. 71.
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that human procreative power is about to occur, and then look again and
notice that some genes have been hyper-activated and then hold Himself
back?
I know that our arguments need to be accessible to all people of good
will, not only to those with faith; yet this important theological-metaphysical point needs to be stated explicitly–especially since the majority of the
signers of the Joint Statement are faithful, pro-life Catholics, and they
seem to have ignored this point.
R ESPECT FOR W OMEN AND M ECHANICAL L ANGUAGE A TTITUDE S HIFTS
This section will include a discussion of puritanism as well as a criticism
offered to that view by Karol Wojty»a/Pope John Paul II. While puritanism was a form of Christianity, and while its critic, Pope John Paul II, is
also a Christian, my argument here does not rely on any faith commitment. The cultural phenomenon of puritanism and its lasting effects on
society can be seen and studied quite well by anyone, as can a critique of
it rooted in a deep understanding of spousal love.
Both the sexual saturation of our Western culture and the rapid
intensity with which the same Western culture pursues IVF and cloning
have a distinct cultural source, as Karol Wojty»a’s book Love and
Responsibility21 makes clear. There he holds a position that at first seems
contradictory, namely, that the sensualists and the puritans of seventeenthcentury England were in theory identical, despite their apparent opposition
in practice, since both are utilitarian.22 Sensualism represents a form of

21

Karol Wojty»a, Love and Responsibility, trans. H.T. Willets (New York NY:
Farrer, Strauss, Giroux, 1981).
22

“With...[the personalistic norm] in mind, we can now exclude as erroneous,
because one-sided and one-sidedly exaggerated, interpretations of the sexual urge.
One such is the libido interpretation.... Another such is the rigorist or puritanical
interpretation.... This interpretation may impress people as a view of sexual
problems based on Christian beliefs...whereas in reality it is built around
naturalistic or empirico-sensualistic principles. It probably arose when it did to
oppose in practice the premises which it accepts itself in theory.... But this
fundamental contradiction between theoretical premises and practical aims made
it possible for the rigorist and puritanical concept to take another path and lapse
into utilitarianism, which is so fundamentally opposed to the value judgments and
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utilitarianism because the other person is reduced to a mere means for the
gratification of one’s own urge for pleasure. The puritans, Wojty»a points
out, reacted against the headlong pursuit of pleasure with a theory that
mimicked Christianity but was just as utilitarian. In the following passage
Wojty»a offers a concise formulation of the utilitarian views that he is
criticizing, views that the puritans held about God and humans:
This view, in its developed form, holds that in using man and woman and their
sexual intercourse to assure the existence of the species Homo, the Creator
Himself uses persons as the means to His end. It follows that conjugal life and
sexual intercourse are good only because they serve the purpose of procreation.
A man therefore does well when he uses a woman as the indispensable means of
obtaining posterity. The use of a person for the objective end of procreation is the
very essence of marriage.23

John F. Crosby has expressed Wojty»a’s position in the following way:
Even if a man and a woman are looking not just for sexual gratification but for
offspring, they might still come into conflict with the personalistic norm of
Wojty»a. For if they put their sexual union in a mere instrumental relation to
offspring, so that in their sexual intimacy they are using each other for getting a
child, then their action is personalistically indefensible. The excellence of the end
does not abolish the disorder that results when persons achieve the end by using
each other. Though Wojty»a makes much of the necessity of remaining open to
offspring (as in his rejection of contraception...), he is aware that there is a way
of practicing this openness that involves the violation of the spouses as persons.24

Wojty»a’s way out of the two forms of utilitarianism is not to reject either
procreation or the pleasure of sex, but to realize that the love between the
spouses is the foundation of sexual relations and of all of the fruits that
flow from them:
Marriage is an institution that exists for the sake of love, not merely for the
purpose of biological reproduction. Marital intercourse is in itself an interpersonal

norms based on the Gospels.” Karol Wojty»a, Love and Responsibility, p. 58.
23

24

Karol Wojty»a, Love and Responsibility, pp. 58-59.

John F. Crosby, Personalist Papers (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Univ. of
America Press, 2004), p. 250.
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act, an act of betrothed love, so that the intentions and the attention of each
partner must be fixed upon the other, upon his or her true good. They must not be
concentrated on the possible consequences of the act, especially if that would
mean a diversion of attention from the partner.25

This past semester, as I was teaching these texts of Wojty»a, one of
my students raised his hand and said to me, “Are there any puritan groups
existing now who use IVF?” 26 I was taken aback, because the question
contains a profound insight. We talked it through during class, and then
I thought about it. Perhaps we could say that the cultural/historical roots
of the most prominent dimensions of the culture of death could be
expressed in the following two assertions:
(A) The “love only” view is actually a form of the self-gratification
approach and leads not only to the exclusion of procreation through
artificial birth control but also to a contraceptive mentality that then
fosters the widespread practice of abortion.
(B) The puritanical mentality of “procreation only” (“increasing the
number of members in our species only”) leads to the exclusion not
only of the pleasure of sex but also of attention to the person of one’s
spouse, and thereby directly to the IVF and cloning mentality, where
conjugal relations can be avoided altogether.
I wonder if these two views, sensualism and puritanism, deeply imbedded
in the historical culture of our society, have fermented into these
widespread immoral practices within the culture of death?
I detect a puritan element in some recent forms of argumentation in
the pro-life movement. For example, of the thirty-five signers of the Joint
Statement, only one is a woman. I have asked some of the male signers
about the many dangers to women that occur as a result of the need for
their eggs in the cloning process. These dangers have been written about
extensively. They include hyper-ovulation, invasive retrieval of eggs,

25

Karol Wojty»a, Love and Responsibility, pp. 233-34 (emphasis added).

26

I am grateful to Kevin Mohan for this insightful question.
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resultant infertility, other injuries and death, the particular temptation to
abuse poor women by offering them money for their eggs, etc.27 The
answers that I received typically began with some sort of logical
argument 28 about how to gain eggs in a morally acceptable way. That fact
might indicate an absorption of the puritan mentality into a segment of the
pro-life movement, such that women become objects of use for biological
reproduction and are ignored as persons. The concern expressed by
Wojty»a about the puritans is that as they turn their focus exclusively to
procreation in an attempt to diminish the experience of pleasure in sexual
relations, they also turn their attention away from the person of their
spouse, thereby reducing him or her to an object of use in a utilitarian
way. Is there not a perceptible similarity between this and ANT-OAR in
that in both cases we see an attempt to harness procreative power that
simultaneously conceives of women as a means to the end of that
harnessing?
Although he is not one the people whom I questioned about the

27

For a concise summary of these dangers, which have already occurred across
the globe, see the September 16, 2006 article “Pressuring Woman to Freeze or
Donate Their Ova,” Zenit.org, ZE06091602. See also the Web site of the Hands
Off Our Ovaries organization, which describes itself as a “coalition of ‘prochoice’ and ‘pro-life’ women, concerned at the growing exploitation of women
in biotechnology.” Their web address is: http://handsoffourovaries.com/ (last
accessed June 15, 2007).
28

One of those arguments runs thus: there are morally licit forms of organ
donation, and so therefore donating eggs could also be morally licit. Schindler
points out that “the difference in the case of gametes, however, is (inter alia) that
sound philosophical and ethical principles have always recognized the special
significance of the finality of the human body’s sexual/reproductive organs by
virtue of their being bound up so directly with the origins of life” (Schindler,
“Response,” p. 378).
Schindler then goes on to raise a number of questions, one of which runs in
this way: “Is this reduction of the oocyte to a mechanism for harvesting body
parts consistent with the Church’s theology of the body...?” To explore this
question goes beyond the scope of my paper, but I concur with its thrust and think
there is a vast area here to be explored through the means of Pope John Paul II’s
Theology of the Body. See John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them, A
Theology of the Body, translation and introduction by Michael Waldstein (Boston
MA: Pauline Books and Media, 2006).
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morality of obtaining eggs from women, Fr. Taduesz Pacholczyk, one of
the signers of the Joint Statement, wrote the following beautiful and true
words in the context of criticizing the sperm and egg banks associated
with fertility clinics:
Our sex cells, or gametes, are special cells. They uniquely identify us. They are
an intimate expression of our own bodily identity, and mark our human
fruitfulness. Hence our own gametes exist in a discernible relationship to
marriage. Each of us, in fact, has been given a capacity, a radical capacity, for
total self-donation to a unique member of the opposite sex in marriage. Our
gametes, and their exclusive availability to our spouse through marital acts, are
an important sign of this radical capacity for self-donation. They uniquely denote
who we are, and manifest the beautiful and life-engendering possibility of giving
ourselves away to the one person whom we singularly love as our husband or
wife. Hence, donating to sperm or egg banks violates something fundamental at
the core of our own humanity. It dissociates us from the deeper meaning of our
own bodies and gravely damages the inner order of marriage.29

It seems to me that these words would apply no less forcefully to the
collection of human female eggs for any purpose, including ANT-OAR.
Furthermore, utilitarianism is the foundation on which artificial birth
control is promoted, and the OAR proposal of the Joint Statement looks
like another form of artificial birth control.30 Is not the attempt to tweak
genes in the somatic cell and/or the egg before combining them in order
to tap into the power of the cytoplasm to “reprogram” a somatic nucleus
back to a pluripotent state (i.e., to avoid the production of a totipotent
zygote) exactly a case of willful manipulation on our part of the mysterious procreative power in order to avoid conception? If, as Schindler
rightly pointed out, “OAR, like ANT, is really a means of artificially
replicating conception,” 31 would it not follow that OAR is either morally
identical to IVF or to artificial birth control?

29

See the April 1, 2006 edition of his column “Making Sense Out of Bioethics,”
titled, “Sperm for Sale,” which can be found at: http://www.ncbcenter.org/
FrTad_MSOOB_10.asp (last accessed Jan. 5, 2008).
30
I am grateful to my student Nakysha Olsen for noting the similarity between
artificial birth control and the claim of ANT-OAR during my lecture on this topic.
31

Schindler, “Response,” p. 372.
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T HE M EANING OF P ERSONHOOD AND
M ECHANICAL L ANGUAGE A TTITUDE S HIFTS
I am indebted to the work of Rev. Dr. Tadeusz Pacholczyk. He demonstrates beyond doubt that therapeutic cloning kills a living member of our
species–a human embryo.32 He makes a sound biological argument, using
undisputed scientific evidence, that the earliest human embryo is a
member of the human species.
But Pacholczyk holds the view that the so-called ensoulment
question is irrelevant in the context of the morality of embryonic stem cell
research and asserts that his view is identical to the position of the
Catholic Church on this point. I would like to focus on this claim now,
since it seems problematic in just the sense that is the theme of this paper.
On a discussion panel recorded by St. Joseph Radio, he said:
The issue of personhood, it gets a lot of billing these days.... People are trying to
come up with this or that criteria.... You can make your own wish list about what
it is that’s going to constitute personhood.... I am absolutely convinced that in the
Church’s analysis of this matter personhood per se is not essential.... What is
essential is the question of whether or not we have a human being. A being that
is human, whether it is yet a person, whether it has been ensouled, all those kinds
of questions are fascinating questions, interesting intellectual questions, but they
are not critical to the moral analysis in the final way that the cards come down
here.33
32

Much of Pacholczyk’s work is in audio and video format. His DVD “Cutting
through the Spin on Stem Cells and Cloning” is excellent, clear, and rooted in his
expertise as a neuroscientist and microbiologist, yet accessible to a wide range of
viewers. It can be ordered at www.ncbcenter.org. He has also recorded a number
of audio discussions on a range of issues in bioethics with St. Joseph Radio.
These can be ordered here: http://www.stjosephradio.com/pages/tapes/familysocial-issues.htm and here: http://www.stjosephradio.org/pages/tapes/fortanasce.
htm (last accessed Jan. 12, 2008). Additionally, he is the author of a column
called “Making Sense out of Bioethics” that appears in various diocesan
newspapers across the country and are all collected and available here:
http://www.ncbcenter.org/makingsense.asp (last accessed Jan. 5, 2008).

33

For the purposes of this paper, I have transcribed quotations from Rev. Dr. Fr.
Tadeusz Pacholczyck and Wesley J. Smith, Esq. from: St. Joseph Radio Presents,
“The Truth About Stem Cell Research and Cloning.” Host: Vincent M.
Fortanesce, Guests: Tadeusz Pacholczyk, Ph.D., Wesley Smith, Esq., and Rex
Greene, M.D. Dallas, TX , May 2, 2003. This audio recording can be purchased
here: http://www.stjosephradio.org/pages/tapes/fortanasce.htm
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I would like to begin by showing that personhood is not merely essential
in the Church’s moral analysis in this context, but is in fact the very
foundation of that analysis. I will then proceed to discuss the difficult
question of what I will call the “two views on personhood” found in two
schools of contemporary literature on the question. Once these two views
are understood, a new and helpful vista of philosophical, as well as
theological, research opens up. Consider the following passage from The
Gospel of Life:
Even if the presence of a spiritual soul cannot be ascertained by empirical data,
the results themselves of scientific research on the human embryo provide “a
valuable indication for discerning by the use of reason a personal presence at the
moment of the first appearance of a human life”: how could a human individual
not be a human person? Furthermore, what is at stake is so important that, from
the standpoint of moral obligation, the mere probability that a human person is
involved would suffice to justify an absolutely clear prohibition of any intervention aimed at killing a human embryo. Precisely for this reason, over and above
all scientific debates and those philosophical affirmations to which the Magisterium has not expressly committed itself,34 the Church has always taught and
continues to teach that the result of human procreation, from the first moment of
its existence, must be guaranteed that unconditional respect which is morally due
to the human being in his or her totality and unity as body and spirit: “The human
being is to be respected and treated as a person from the moment of conception;
and therefore from that same moment his rights as a person must be recognized,
among which in the first place is the inviolable right of every innocent human

34

Although the Church has not yet issued a succinct assertion affirming that a
zygote is a person, there are numerous texts, some in the form of rhetorical
questions, in which she has made quite clear what she will say: that every living
human is also fully a person, including this text of The Gospel of Life, 60. Seifert
and Nelson have made this point quite clearly. Also, in the question period after
presenting this paper, Jeanne Guerin made the point that theologically the Church
has pronounced on this point affirmatively in her infallible teaching on the
Immaculate Conception, which states that Mary was free from original sin from
the first moment of her conception. Her point seems to be correct, since one must
be a person in order to be a subject of sin or not. Nelson notes this as well
(Nelson, p. 307). I think, however, that the Church will not define the ensoulment
question as an article of faith, but will rather wait until it can also be seen more
clearly from a philosophical perspective before giving an explicit pronouncement
on it.
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being to life.” 35

Pacholczyk’s assertion stands in contrast to the Church’s position insofar
as he thinks that the issue of personhood in the early embryo is irrelevant
to the moral analysis, while the Church holds that even the possibility of
personhood makes all the difference in that analysis. Another way to
express the contrast is to say that while both Pacholczyk and the Church
recognize the distinction between human and person in the sense that the
former is known with certainty through science and the latter is not,
Pacholczyk thinks that the latter term of the distinction, person, is
irrelevant to the moral discussion, while the Church puts the primary
focus on that term. 36 When the Church says here that “...what is at stake
is so important...,” she is referring to personhood. And when she says that
35

Evangelium vitae (The Gospel of Life) §60. The quotations within the quote are
from Donum vitae (February 22, 1987), I §1: AAS 80 (1988): 78-79.
36

I would like to note here the following theological point. With respect to the
idea of a distinction between person and human nature, there simply is in the
mind of the Church such a distinction; for otherwise how could there have been
a divine person (the Word of God) who first did not have human nature and then
took it on? Another way to see this with respect to Christ is to note that He is one
person but has two natures; this means that there is a distinction between person
and human nature. Also, the Father and the Holy Spirit are persons without
human nature, as are angels and demons.
Now, to say that “all human beings are persons” is true, but to interpret that
utterance to mean that there is nothing more to personhood than humanity, or to
mean an identity of personhood with humanity is an error–a tempting error for
someone who is pro-life to make, since humanity is biologically provable, but an
error just the same. Science is a failsafe way to recognize that an entity is human,
but it is primarily love and philosophy by which we recognize persons, and it is
through these that we must see and argue for their presence. Following the
Christian personalists cited later in this paper and others, including Pope John
Paul II, I have attempted in two articles to express and develop what personhood
is and to set that view of it against the view of Singer and other thinkers who do
not hold it. See Peter J. Colosi, “The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Revisiting Peter
Singer and His Critics,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 15 (2003): 3-22
and “The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojty»a/Pope
John Paul II, with Emphasis on His Indebtedness to Max Scheler,” ch. 3 in Karol
Wojtyla’s Philosophical Legacy, eds. Nancy Mardas Billias, Agnes B. Curry and
George F. McLean (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and
Philosophy, 2008), pp. 61-100.
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it is “[p]recisely for this reason...,” she is referring to the probable
presence of a person, not the certain presence of the human zygote known
by biology. And when she emphasizes that “[t]he human being is to be
respected and treated as a person from the moment of conception; and
therefore from that same moment his rights as a person must be recognized...,” she indicates a distinction between human and person, and notes
that the source of respect flows from the personhood of the new human
being.37
I will address later the question concerning our knowledge of the
personhood of the zygote, but at this point we should note that the mere
fact that one does not know for certain whether personhood is present
does not give one a reason to think that the very personhood that one
cannot quite see is not anymore the foundational metaphysical reality for
the moral law against killing embryos. Or, to make the point in terms of
the theme of this paper, to cast off the mysterious question of the
personhood of the tiniest members of our species and to call that question
irrelevant to the moral question represents another case of a portion of the
pro-life movement drifting off to the “secure” world of empirical science,
and it also represents a lack of attention to the texts of the Church on the
matter.
To show a spiritual personal presence in a zygote, the Church herself
grants is difficult. But this is not a reason to reduce the entire question to
biology, nor to give up on philosophy. Yet, there is a tendency within a
segment the pro-life movement to do just that. Here is an example from
Wesley Smith38 (who is not one of the signers of the Joint Statement),
given on the same radio show, in answer to a caller who questioned their
reduction of the argument to biology only:
Betty, what’s happened in bioethics is because the biology that Father was just
37

N elson comes to the same conclusion when, after considering texts of the
Church, he says that in them “...a human being’s fundamental right to life is here
derived from personhood.” See “A Human Being Must Be a Person,” p. 296.
38
I am an admirer and promoter of the important work of Wesley J. Smith. It is
just this particular point that I think needs further reflection. See Peter J. Colosi,
book review of Forced Exit: The Slippery Slope from Assisted Suicide to
Legalized Murder by Wesley J. Smith (Dallas TX: Spence, 2003) in The Catholic
Social Science Review 11 (2006): 319-23.
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describing is against some of the agenda that many in bioethics wish to pursue....
So, they brought in philosophy instead of biology, and they are saying, well, some
human life is a person and some human lives are not persons. And that leads to
a subjective analysis, and it leads to a hierarchy of human life. If we’re going to
have universal human rights and universal human dignity, human life, it seems
to me, must be judged objectively....39

This statement suggests a belief that biology alone is sufficient to
determine morality, and that the introduction of philosophy is problematic.40 But, as Robert E. Joyce has shown, the crucial question of
39

St. Joseph Radio Presents: “The Truth About Stem Cell Research and Cloning.”
Host: Vincent M. Fortanesce, Guests: Tadeusz Pacholczyk, PhD, Wesley Smith,
Esq. and Rex Greene, M.D. Dallas, TX, May 2, 2003.
40

What is also interesting is that on the same radio discussion, in contrast to their
view that science is the basis of the moral norms in this realm, both Pacholczyk
and Smith assert that science is incapable of generating moral norms. Pacholczyk
stated: “Pure science, strictly speaking, is not able to provide a system of values;
it can give you something that works, and if you decide beforehand that,
technically, when something works, that makes it good, then you can say science
is...implying certain values. But science itself is morally a neutral sort of an
enterprise, and the problem is only how you’re going to carry on this enterprise.
And what good and goals are you going to decide need to be sought after or
safeguarded through the kind of science that you practice. So, there’s a big
difference...between ethical positions, which some would say are derivative
philosophically and pure science.”
And Wesley Smith stated: “To me science is like the force, it’s neutral...and
there’s the dark side and there’s the good side.... When science helps us overcome
disease, that is generally a positive, but if you are going to overcome disease by
killing people, and using the body parts of other people to benefit certain
privileged people that would perhaps be scientific, but it would be immoral.
Science cannot provide us the basis for morality. It...isn’t designed for that.... It
might tell us how things work, but it can’t tell us the difference between good and
bad, right or wrong. And what’s going wrong in our society...is something called
scientism, that is, we are turning to science for things that it cannot provide, that
is, what is right, what is wrong. We are turning to science to find the answers to
the meaning of life, and...how life should be lived, and that is not something that
science is capable of providing answers for. If all you care about is science, there
really are going to be no limits, because the limits we put on science, quite
properly, are moral limits, they’re ethical limits, they’re not scientific limits.”
These two texts contradict the idea of grounding the entire moral argument
in biology, and they show a basic understanding that philosophy is, indeed,
needed and able to grasp clear moral truths. These authors and others who so
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personhood is a philosophical question:
What is a person? When is a person? These questions are essentially philosophical. They require an integration of our knowledge of certain basic data and
conclusions in embryology. But they are not specifically scientific questions. We
go beyond the eyeball vision and verification involved in natural science, while
taking it carefully into account, and we try to say ultimately what this tiny,
microscopic creature called a human zygote really is. Biologically viewed, even
an adult human being cannot be said to be a person. For a biologist, as a biologist,
you and I are simply human organisms. But for the biologist as a philosopher...you and I can readily be recognized as persons.41

Furthermore, as noted by Stephen Schwarz, “[a]n abortion advocate who
admits that the being in the womb is human life but denies that that human
life is a person cannot be refuted on purely scientific grounds.” 42 This
refers to the fact that the contemporary theoretical defense given by those
in favor of abortion and euthanasia does not dispute, but openly agrees
with the biological facts presented by those in the pro-life movement.
Consider this text of Peter Singer, perhaps the most well-known defender
of the moral acceptability of killing living human beings at the beginning
and end of life:
Whether a being is a member of a given species is something that can be
determined scientifically..., there is no doubt that from the first moments of its
existence an embryo conceived from human sperm and eggs is a human being;
and the same is true of the most profoundly and irreparably intellectually disabled
helpfully elucidate the biological truths involved should follow their intuitions in
these second set of quotations, and as Pope Benedict said, have “[t]he courage to
engage the whole breadth of reason....” See Pope Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason
and the University: Memories and Reflections,” reprinted in The Catholic World
Report (October 2006), p. 22.
41

Cited in Stephen Schwartz, The Moral Question of Abortion (Chicago IL:
Loyola Univ. Press, 1990), p. 81. Original reference: Robert E. Joyce, “When
Does a Person Being” in New Perspectives on Human Abortion, eds. Thomas W.
Hilgers, M.D., Dennis J. Horan, and David Mall (Frederick MD: Univ.
Publications of American, Aletheia Books, 1981), p. 346. Schwarz’s excellent
development of the philosophical understanding of personhood and its defense
against the most prevalent actualist (to be explained below) notions of personhood
deserves careful study. See esp. chs. 6 and 7 of The Moral Question of Abortion.
42

Schwarz, The Moral Question of Abortion, p. 80.
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human being, even of an infant who is born anencephalic–literally, without a
brain.43

With this we can turn to what I referred to above as the “two views
on personhood.” One of these views is held by a school of thought that I
will refer to with the term “contemporary utilitarianism,” and Singer is its
most prominent figure. The other view is held by a school of thought that
I will refer to with the term “Christian personalism.” Both of these are
philosophical schools of thought; that is, even though the latter is termed
“Christian,” this refers to the environment in which and because of which
this philosophical school emerged, not that its arguments are theological
or based on divine Revelation.
The problem with the quotation above from Smith is his implication
that bringing philosophy to the question leads to a subjective analysis and
that biology alone can lead to an objective one. Nonetheless, his assertion
that biological facts run counter to the agenda of many bioethicists today
is correct. One way to state this point is to suggest that perhaps the real
reason why contemporary utilitarians turned to developing their view on
personhood is precisely because they could no longer claim that an
embryo was not human. In other words, those in favor of abortion and
euthanasia needed to find a way to deny the personhood of those classes
of humans whom they wanted to kill, while at the same time being able to
agree with the developments in science that conclusively proved that those
beings were humans. Such a project was necessary from their point of
view in order to have some reasons to present to the public for killing
beings whom everyone now knew to be living members of the human
species.
What, then, is the new definition of personhood presented by
contemporary utilitarianism? For that school of thought, a person is a
human who is consciously alert at a mature level. As Singer says, “I
propose to use ‘person,’ in the sense of a rational and self-conscious
being.” 44 This identification of personhood with actualized conscious-

43

Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993),
pp. 85-86.

44

Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 87.
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ness 45 at a mature level leads to the distinction between personal and nonpersonal humans: “Normal adults and children, but not fetuses and infants,
are persons; that is, they are self-aware and purposeful beings with a sense
of the past and the future.” 46 In this way he builds the foundation for his
argument in favor of killing some classes of humans, including (healthy
or not) newborn babies, and disabled children:
The embryo, the later fetus, the profoundly intellectually disabled child, even the
newborn infant–all are indisputably members of the species Homo sapiens but
none are self-aware, have a sense of the future, or the capacity to relate to
others.47

I would like now to present the view of personhood of Christian personalism. This view does not identify personhood with consciousness. The
quickest way to understand this view is to ask whether you, when you are
in a state of dreamless sleep or unconscious from fainting, still exist as the
person you are, or whether for that period of time you do not exist. You
do still exist then, and this means that you have more reality than just
being awake. It is not true, then, that the loss of consciousness equals the
loss of personal being.48 To secure this point represents a challenge,
45

This view of personhood is sometimes referred to as “actualism,” since it holds
that only persons with actualized consciousness are in fact persons and rejects the
view that there can be persons existing who have only potential consciousness.

46

Peter Singer, Unsanctifying Human Life, ed. Helga Kuse (Oxford U K:
Blackwell, 2002), p. 239.
47

Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 86. I apologize for reproducing that quotation,
especially for those readers who have a dear little baby in their lives right now
and had to read it. Among the many pages where Singer asserts that killing
humans with minimal consciousness is morally unobjectionable, see Practical
Ethics, pp. 89-95; but, as a warning, pp. 90 and 95 are very degrading to newborn
babies.
48

Often when teaching this view of contemporary utilitarianism, I find that people
ask whether Singer and those like him hold that it is morally acceptable to kill
adults in a state of dreamless sleep since they would not fit the definition of
personhood. Singer does apparently feel the force of this problem because he
attempts an explanation that will land him on the side of not favoring the killing
of adult sleeping humans (see Practical Ethics, pp. 95-99). The reason that he
gives there, however, avoids the metaphysical question of a personal presence in
a sleeping adult, because he couches his answer in terms of his view that “[t]o
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especially at the earliest stages of human life when signs of personhood
are not apparent to us. That difficulty does not, however, constitute a
reason to stop exploring the question, nor does it constitute a reason to
exclude all but the empirical sciences as sources of knowledge in this
realm.
You, as the person who you are, exist even when you are not
conscious, and this means that other human beings who are not conscious
could also do that. In the branch of philosophy that I am calling Christian
personalism, there have been many convincing arguments developed to
show the reasonableness of the presence of a person in all classes of nonconscious or minimally conscious living human beings.49
have a right to life, one must have, or at least at one time have had, the concept
of having a continued existence” (p. 98). Since it happens that when awake I am
able not to be thinking about one of my many desires for the future that is
nonetheless within me, Singer argues that “when we go to sleep our desires for
the future have not ceased to exist. They will still be there when we wake. As the
desires are still part of us, so, too, our interest in continued life remains part of us
while we are asleep or unconscious” (pp. 98-99). This answer seems to me to be
a weak attempt to get himself off the hook of having to admit that his
metaphysical view (personhood = conscious awareness) leads to the conclusion
that sleeping adults are not persons, and that therefore they could be killed if the
utilitarian calculus so determined. It does not, however, answer the question about
the metaphysical status of that sleeping person; that is, this answer only says there
is a right not to be killed for an unconscious being (in his view, metaphysically,
a non-personal human) who (we think) will wake up and have the same desires
that he had before going to sleep. He also expresses no indication of how he can
hold that the desires “have not ceased to exist” when consciousness has ceased.
His followers ought not to let him get away with that slight of hand, but should
ask for an explanation.
49

I will not in this paper be able fully to develop the main arguments of the
following authors. I do intend to present as my submission for the next UFL
conference a paper in which I do so, particularly because I do not think these
arguments have yet been given the full consideration they call for. See Stephen
Schwarz, The Moral Question of Abortion (Chicago IL: Loyola U niv. Press,
1990), chs. 6 and 7 (where Schwarz deals directly with a series of arguments from
the main proponents of the consciousness/person identity theory); Josef Seifert,
What is Life? (Amsterdam, N etherlands: Rodopi, 1997), chs. 3 and 4; John F.
Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
Univ. of America Press, 1996), ch. 4; John F. Crosby, Personalist Papers
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Univ. of America Press, 2004), ch. 6. The
following are monographs dedicated to an elucidation of the spiritual reality of
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One sometimes finds in pro-life authors the phrase “personhood
theory” spoken of in a derogatory way, as if it were only the proponents
of the culture of death who have developed such a theory. But one ought
not forget that the ancient tradition of the Church is where the theory of
personhood was developed within the first five centuries after Christ. This
fact should have both theological and philosophical ramifications in
discussions concerning personhood. Theologically, we know that God is
three persons, that He creates human persons, and that in those ancient
discussions “person” is not identified with “consciousness.” And so,
speaking from a theological-historical point of view, I find that it makes
no sense to let contemporary bio-ethicists co-opt the terms “person” or
“personhood theory.” This is so, for theologically God is three persons,
and historically personhood theory has been around long before contemporary utilitarianism arose.
With respect to philosophy, it must be pointed out that although those
ancient discussions developed primarily because of heretical views
concerning Jesus, but also to deepen our understanding of the Holy
Trinity, much can be gained from them philosophically because intertwined with that theology is much rich philosophical reflection.
One must not accept the contemporary identification of personhood
and actualized consciousness as all there is to say on the matter, and then
given up the argument. Nor should those who do not accept that identification give up pursuing the question because of its difficulty. In his
defense of reason against its reduction to empirical methods alone, Pope
Benedict XVI noted an exchange between Socrates and Phaedo in which
Socrates cautions Phaedo against falling into misology–hatred of
argumentation–just because many false opinions abound. In this way such
a person, Socrates says, “would be deprived of the truth of existence and

the soul/person by authors coming from within the realist phenomenological/
Christian personalist traditions: Josef Seifert, Das Leib Seele Problem und die
gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion (D armstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1989); Ludger Hölscher, Die Realität des Geistes, eine
Darstellung und phänomenologische Neubegründung der Argumente Augustins
für die geistige Substantialität der Seele (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C.
Winter, 1999); this book also exists in an earlier English version as The Reality
of the Mind: Augustine’s Philosophical Arguments for the Hum an Soul as a
Spiritual Substance (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1986).
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would suffer a great loss.” 50
We can think more deeply about human personal existence; and with
philosophical and theological arguments (taking care to note their
distinctiveness) we can reveal that its depth is greater than consciousness.
As I mentioned in a note above, it would extend beyond the bounds of this
paper to examine that question thoroughly, but some introductory
directions can be pointed out. One might begin by first formulating and
expressing clearly the view that human persons can lose their consciousness in many ways, but their immaterial personhood remains. This idea is
made quite clear in a text from Romano Guardini that Joseph Cardinal
Ratzinger quoted shortly before his election to the papacy when discussing the right to life. The idea is this: personhood is metaphysically deeper
than consciousness. No one accepts that humans in dreamless sleep, since
they lack consciousness, may be killed. Here spiritual personhood is
intuitively grasped as deeper than conscious wakefulness. This is felt so
strongly that, as shown above, even the actualists feel the need to say
something about it. One must then develop arguments to reveal the
metaphysical structure of what is being grasped here and to show how it
could reasonably be applied to all living humans deprived of this or that
level of consciousness.51 In Aristotelian terms we could express this idea
by saying that an embryo, a comatose patient, or healthy adult in a state
of dreamless sleep are all actual persons who are potentially conscious.
Here is the quote from Guardini, utilized by Cardinal Ratzinger in his
defense of pre-born human life (Guardini employs the term “personality,”
where I would say “person”):
50

See Pope Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason and the U niversity, Memories and
Reflections,” reprinted in The Catholic World Report (October 2006): 19-22.
51

The announcement on March 20, 2004 of Pope John Paul II to the participants
of an international conference entitled “Life-Sustaining Treatments and
Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas” needs such a
philosophical foundation and represents a call to discover one: “I feel the duty to
reaffirm strongly that the intrinsic value and personal dignity of every human
being do not change, no matter what the concrete circumstances of his or her life.
A man, even if seriously ill or disabled in the exercise of his highest functions, is
and always will be a man, and he will never become a “vegetable” or an “animal.”
Even our brothers and sisters who find themselves in the clinical condition of a
“vegetative state” retain their human dignity in all its fullness.” Quoted on
Zenit.org (April 5, 2004).
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Man is not inviolable merely in virtue of the fact that he exists.... Man’s life
remains inviolable because he is a person.... To be a person is not a psychological
but an existential fact: it does not depend fundamentally on one’s age or
psychological condition or on the gifts of nature with which the subject is
provided.... The personality may remain below the threshold of consciousness–for
example when we are sleeping–but it remains, nevertheless, and must be taken
into account. The personality may as yet be undeveloped–for example, when we
are children–but it has a claim to moral respect from the very beginning. It is even
possible that the personality in general may not emerge in one’s acts, since the
psycho-physical presuppositions are lacking–as in those who are mentally ill....
Finally, the personality can also remain hidden–as in the embryo–but it exists in
the embryo from the outset and has its own rights. It is this personality that gives
men their dignity.52

C ONCLUSION
In this paper I have endeavored to present three basic problems within
some prominent contemporary pro-life argumentation. All three are rooted
in one basic underlying foundational problem: the tendency towards
putting all argumentation on the sole foundation of biology/genetics. This
is a tempting direction in which to proceed, since the facts of genetics and
biology are empirically verifiable and are undeniable even by the
proponents of the culture of death. If this approach is exclusive, however,
it reveals an implicit distrust of reason beyond the empirical; and also
leads to moral and conceptual dangers. The three problems that I have
52

Romano Guardini, “I diritti del nascituro,” Studi cattolici (May/June 1974),
cited in Joseph Ratzinger, Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, trans. Brian
McN eil (San Francisco CA: Ignatius Press, 2006), pp. 68-69. Peter Singer is
famous for asserting the exact opposite of this view: “Normal adults and
children, but not fetuses and infants, are persons; that is, they are self-aware and
purposeful beings with a sense of the past and the future. They can see their lives
as a continuing process, they can identify with what has happened to them in the
past, and they have hopes and plans for the future. For this reason we can say that
in normal circumstances they value, or want, their own continued existence, and
that life is in their interest. The same does not apply to fetuses or new-born
infants. Neither a fetus or an infant has the conceptual wherewithal to contemplate
a future and to want, or value, that future.” Peter Singer, Unsanctifying H um an
Life, ed. Helga Kuse (Oxford UK: Blackwell, 2002), p. 239.
The mere fact that it is an easier task for Singer to point out that babies can’t
comprehend the concept “future” than it is for us to show the presence of a fully
actual person in a newborn, who is potentially able to form the concept “future,”
is not a reason to stop pursuing the question.
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touched on are these: a neglect of the role of God in human procreation,
a neglect of the dignity of women, and a neglect of understanding
personal being.
I have not meant to offend anyone with this article. I have simply
picked out specific examples of a trend that would help make the points
with clarity and concision. I hope that allies in the pro-life movement will
be forthright with me whenever they perceive me to be expressing ideas
that might tend away from genuine concern for the dignity of human
persons.

